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ABSTRACT
Governments increasingly focus on extending working lives by raising public pension ages and in some cases by 
linking pension ages to changes in the life expectancy. This study offers novel insights into how employers perceive 
such reforms and their consequences for their organization. A survey among employers (N = 1,208) has been carried 
out in 2017 to examine their reactions to a recent pension reform in the Netherlands. Statistical analyses are per-
formed to examine employers’ support for the current policy of linking the public pension age to changes in average 
life expectancy, as well as the support for 2 alternative policies that are often considered in public policy debates: a 
flexible public pension age; and a lower public pension age for workers in physically demanding jobs. Results show 
that particularly employers in construction and industry are extremely concerned about the physical capability of 
employees to keep on working until the public pension age. These concerns are the driving forces behind the lack of 
support for linking public pension ages to changes in average life expectancy (22% support) and the overwhelming 
support for a lower public pension age for physically demanding jobs (82%). The introduction of a flexible pension 
age (78% support) is not firmly related to employers’ concerns about capability or employability of older workers.
In OECD countries, population aging is a fact of life. Due to a growing 
relative share of people entitled to public pensions, taxes or premiums 
for such programs are expected to increase dramatically if pension 
rights remain the same. Many countries have therefore implemented 
reforms that improve the financial sustainability of public pension 
programs by increasing the public pension age (OECD, 2017). How 
individual employers view this imposed change is, until now, largely 
missing from the scholarly debate (Henkens et al., 2018). This is un-
fortunate because employers are the main stakeholders in the develop-
ment of organizational policies that facilitate active and healthy aging 
(Oude Mulders, Henkens, & Van Dalen, 2019).
This article is the first to examine the perspective of employers on 
extending working lives by increasing the public pension age. We will 
specifically consider the Netherlands, where the national government 
(in 2012) decided to gradually increase the public pension age, forcing 
older workers to work substantially longer than previously planned 
or expected. Furthermore, the public pension age will be automat-
ically linked to upward changes in the average life expectancy at age 
65 from 2022 onwards in a one-to-one fashion: a 1  year increase in 
average life expectancy will imply a 1 year higher public pension age. 
This is projected to lead to a steep increase in the public pension age 
in the coming decades (Figure 1). And with this policy reform the 
Netherlands is expected to have one of the highest projected public 
pension age in the world (OECD, 2017, p. 22).
The relatively rapid increase of the public pension age in the 
Netherlands has not been without consequences or controversy: many 
older workers are frustrated about the reforms and are concerned 
about their ability to continue working in good mental and physical 
condition until the public pension age (Van Solinge & Henkens, 2017). 
Boot and colleagues (2014) note that the prevalence of chronic health 
conditions is increasing and will affect the position of older workers 
in particular: 59% of Dutch older workers experience such chronic 
health conditions and these have a significantly negative impact on 
work-related outcomes such as disability or sickness (cf. Staubli & 
Zweimüller, 2013).
We will analyze data of 1,208 Dutch employers, examining to 
what extent employers support the current policy reform and alter-
native policy options that offer more flexible exit routes for workers. 
Additionally, we study whether their support can be explained by con-
cerns about older workers’ ability to continue working in good mental 
and physical condition. We will analyze the following public pension 
age policies: (a) the status quo: linking the public pension age directly 
to changes in the average life expectancy; (b) the alternative of of-
fering differentiated public pension ages, where workers in physically 
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demanding jobs have a lower public pension age compared to those 
who work in nonphysically demanding jobs; and (c) the alternative of 
a flexible public pension age, where citizens can choose a lower or a 
higher public pension age in an actuarially neutral fashion. Hence those 
workers choosing a retirement date before the standard public pension 
age will have a lower benefit level per year, whereas those delaying their 
retirement date will have a higher benefit per year. These alternative 
policies are both at the focus of attention in public debates in many 
countries (Börsch-Supan, Bucher-Koenen, Kutlu-Koc, & Goll, 2018; 
Hagemann & Scherger, 2016; Johnson, 2018).
CONTRACT THEORY
In understanding employers’ concerns about increasing the public 
pension age, it is key to understand why mandatory retirement clauses 
are standard practice in many countries. Lazear (1979) showed that 
the so-called “implicit contract”—in which workers are paid less than 
their productivity during the first part of their career and more than 
their productivity in the second part—is a long-term contract that 
satisfies both employers’ and employees’ interests. These seniority 
wages can in principle foster the bond between employers and em-
ployees because the prospect of an increasing wage works as an incen-
tive to stay with your employer and prevent workers from shirking. 
In Europe, such seniority wage contracts are common (Conen, Van 
Dalen, & Henkens, 2012; Deelen, 2012; Deelen & Euwals, 2014). 
However, this contract crucially depends on including a mandatory 
retirement age. An extension of the working life due to an increasing 
public pension age in connection with increasing wages over the life-
time jeopardizes the sustainability of the “implicit contract” between 
employer and employee (Lazear, 1990). Indeed, Frimmel, Horvath, 
Schnalzenberger, and Winter-Ebmer (2018) show that, in Austria, 
steep seniority wage profiles tend to cause earlier job exits of older 
workers and often steep wage profiles also lead to a higher incidence 
of so-called “golden handshakes” (especially among blue collar 
workers).
From a psychological perspective, government reforms that in-
crease the public pension age can also be seen as an external force that 
puts pressure on the psychological contract between employers and 
employees (Robinson, 1996; Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993). 
Employers and employees are then forced to retain their employment 
relationship till a much higher age than foreseen and may perceive this 
as a breach of contract. The perceived consequences of such a breach 
are central in understanding attitudes and behavior of both contract 
parties. Strikes and demonstrations in Europe against plans to increase 
the public pension age show how workers view this breach. How em-
ployers perceive this specific breach of the psychological contract is 
less well examined (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000). The extension 
of the employment relationship imposed by the pension reforms 
may trigger concerns by employers about workers abilities to keep on 
working. Moreover, these concerns might translate in calls for more 
flexible exit routes from the labor market.
We formulate three hypotheses based on the theoretical consider-
ations mentioned above:
Hypothesis 1:  The support for an automatic linkage of 
the public pension age to changes in life 



















official predicon government own predicon
Figure 1. The increase in official public pension age, by birth cohorts, the Netherlands. Note. Predictions are based on life 
expectancy predictions at age 65 by Statistics Netherlands and the public pension age formula stated in the Dutch pension law: 
V = (L − 18.26) − (P − 65), where V is the period with which the public pension age is increased, expressed in years; L is the 
average life expectancy at age 65 in the year in which the increase is made, the parameter 18.26 is the average life expectancy at age 
65 in the reference year of the legislated change; P is the public pension age in the year preceding the year of the increase. In case V 
is negative or less than 0.25 years, the value of V will be set at zero (pension age decreases are ruled out by law). Increases are not 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Description Statistics
Dependent variables
 Support public pension policies
    Linking public pension age to changes in  
life expectancy
In your opinion, what should happen to the public pension 
age? (1) linking the public pension age to changes in 
average life expectancy; (2) public pension age back to age 
65, (3) public pension age to be fixed at age 67. Options 
(2) and (3) are collapsed into the benchmark (=0) and 
the linked pension age (=1)
22%





 In favor 43%
 Strongly in favor 39%
  Flexible public pension age Against 5%
 Neutral 17%
 In favor 78%
Predictor variables
 Employers’ concerns: Nowadays, employees have to work much longer 
than before. To what extent are you as an employer 
concerned:
 
   Whether employees are physically capable 
to do so
no/little concerned 28%
 fairly concerned 30%
 very concerned 27%
 extremely concerned 15%
   Whether employees are  
mentally capable to do so
no/little concerned 27%
 fairly concerned 40%
 very concerned 26%
 extremely concerned 7%
   About the limited employability of 
employees with health problems
no/little concerned 20%
 fairly concerned 31%
 very concerned 32%
 extremely concerned 17%
 Sectors of industry (based on SBI codes, 6-dummy variable)
  Services and trade  29%
  Industry  28%
  Construction  6%
  Education  9%
  Health care  21%
  Other public sector  6%
 Size of organization (3-dummy variable):
  Small (10–50 employees)  33%
  Middle (50–249 employees)  39%
  Large (more than 250 employees)  28%
 Personnel composition (proportion of total):
  Older workers (aged 50+)  M = 0.32 (SD = 0.18)
  Female workers  M = 0.43 (SD = 0.31)
  Low educated workers  M = 0.53 (SD = 0.31)









roningen user on 12 N
ovem
ber 2019
258 • H. P. van Dalen
employers’ concerns about the employability 
of older workers with health issues and older 
workers’ mental and physical capacities to 
extend their career.
Hypothesis 2:  The support for lower public pension ages 
for workers in physically demanding jobs is 
expected to be higher the higher employers’ 
concerns about the physical capacities of 
workers extending their career.
Hypothesis 3:  The support for flexible public pension age policies 
is expected to be lower the higher employers’ 
concerns about the employability of older workers 
with health issues and older workers’ mental and 
physical capacities to extend their career.
METHODS
Data
Data were collected from Dutch employers between December of 
2016 and March of 2017. First, a sample of 6,000 organizations with at 
least 10 employees was drawn. Organizations with fewer than 10 em-
ployees were excluded because they commonly have little formal HR 
management and deal with aging in an ad hoc way (Cardon & Stevens, 
2004). The sample was stratified according to size and sector, meaning 
large organizations and those in the public sector were oversampled, 
and small organizations and those in the services sector were under-
sampled, to ensure sufficient responses from all types of relevant or-
ganizations. The questionnaire was addressed to the director or CEO 
of the organization, although the letter stated that also other employees 
know about the organizations’ background and practices could partici-
pate A hard copy questionnaire was sent to the organizations, along 
with an accompanying letter inviting them to participate in the study. 
The letter also contained a unique code with which the employers 
could access an online version of the questionnaire. Two reminders 
were sent, one containing a letter reminding them of the survey and the 
code for the online questionnaire, and one also containing a new hard 
copy of the questionnaire. Half of the responses came from the hard 
copy questionnaire, while the other half came from the online version. 
In total, 1,312 organizations participated in the study, generating a re-
sponse rate of 23%. This rate is lower than the average response rates 
for individual-based surveys but in line with those generally found in 
organization surveys (Baruch & Holtom, 2008; Van Dalen, Henkens, 
& Wang, 2015). Item nonresponse on the independent variables was 
between 0.5% and 3%. We dealt with missing data using single sto-
chastic regression imputation (Enders, 2010, pp. 46–49). Under these 
circumstances, less rigorous missing data procedures than multiple im-
putations are generally acceptable (Little, Jorgensen, Lang, & Moore, 
2014). Following Von Hippel’s (2007) recommendation, we included 
our dependent variables during the imputation process, but included 
only those cases where all dependent variables were nonmissing 
(N = 1,208) in our model estimation.
Measures
Descriptive statistics of all variables and the wording of the survey 
questions are presented in Table 1. The three dependent variables in-
dicate the level support or the lack of support for the three types of 
public pension age policies.
The key predictor variables are employers’ concerns about em-
ployees’ abilities to work longer. We control for sector of industry, 
organizational size (measured by the number of employees); and 
the proportion of older workers, low skilled workers, women, and 
part-time workers. To control for individual employer effects, we con-
trol for age, sex, and their position. The correlation matrix is presented 
in Table 1A.
Table 1 shows that there is widespread support for the alternative 
public pension age policies that allow for more flexibility: 78% sup-
ports flexible public pension ages and 82% (combining percentages 
of those “in favor,” 43%, and those “strongly in favor,” 39%) supports 
a lower public pension age for physically demanding jobs. In contrast, 
there is limited support for the status quo policy of linking the public 
pension age to changes in the life expectancy: 22% supports this policy. 
For the employers’ concerns, results show that 42% of employers are 
very/extremely concerned that employees will not be physically cap-
able to continue working until the public pension age. Concerns are 
less widespread when it comes to the question whether employees are 
mentally capable to continue working until their retirement age, with 
33% of employers being very/extremely concerned. Almost half of the 
employers are very or extremely concerned about limited employability 
of their personnel due to health problems, which may be explained by 
strict eligibility rules for entrance in Dutch disability programs. Table 2 
shows, based on ordered logit analyses, that concerns differ greatly by 
sector, size of organization, and personnel staff composition: the level 
of concern is higher in large organizations, organizations with a higher 
percentage of older workers, and in the construction industry.
Variables Description Statistics
 Gender employer (male = 0)  37%
  Age employer (in years)  M = 50.9 (SD = 9.70)
 Position
  Director/CEO  22%
  Owner  23%
  Manager  7%
  HR manager  26%
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RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results of the logit and ordered logit analyses 
explaining employers’ support for different public pension age pol-
icies. We carried out the analyses in two steps. In Step 1, we estimated 
models regressing support for the public pension age policies on a 
set of control variables (sector, size, composition of staff, and indi-
vidual employer characteristics). In Step 2, we included employers’ 
concerns as key predictor variables. The first step reveals that sector 
and staff composition are important. For example, a lower public 
pension age for physically demanding jobs receives more support 
from employers in the industry, construction, and education sector. 
Employers with more lower educated workers also support a lower 
public pension age for physically demanding jobs but do not support 
a system with flexible public pension ages. Also, female employers 
are more supportive of lower public pension ages for physically 
demanding jobs and have less support for pension ages linked to life 
expectancy. The main focus of our article is on employers’ concerns, 
which are included as key predictor variables in Step 2 of our model. 
The key predictor variables explain 5%, 4%, and 1% of the variance 
beyond the control variables in employers’ support for status quo 
policy, a lower public pension age for physically demanding jobs, 
and a flexible public pension age, respectively. (An additional way 
of assessing the total effect size of including concerns as predictors 
of support for different public pension policies is to compare per-
centages of correct predictions of the model. In the model explaining 
support for the status quo the percentage of correct predictions in-
creases from 78% to 79% after including employers’ concerns. For 
the model explaining support for a lower pension age for physically 
demanding jobs, the correct predictions increase from 47% to 53%. 
There is no increase in correct predictions in the model explaining 
support for a flexible public pension age. These results show that al-
though concerns are important predictors of the likelihood of policy 
preferences, it is more difficult in predicting individual employers’ 
preferences.)
Column 1 of Table 3 clearly shows that concerns about workers 
being physically and mentally capable to continue working are main 
predictors of rejecting the status quo policy of linking public pension 
ages to changes in life expectancy. In explaining support for the alter-
native public policies, we first consider the lower public pension age 
for physically demanding jobs (column 2 in Table 3). The likelihood 
of supporting a lower public pension age for physical demanding jobs 
is much higher among employers who are concerned about older 
Table 2. Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses Explaining Employers’ Concerns About the Prospect of Employees Working 
Longer (N = 1,208)
Concerns About Employees Working Longer
Organizational characteristics Physical Demands Mental Demands Limited Employability Workers 
With Health Problems
 OR Coefficient t Value OR Coefficient t Value OR Coefficient t Value
Sector (Services = 0)          
 Industry 1.88** 0.63 4.15 1.18 0.17 1.10 1.35* 0.30 1.97
 Construction 5.71** 1.74 6.63 2.81** 1.03 4.06 1.46 0.38 1.50
 Education 0.89 −0.11 0.49 1.69* 0.53 2.35 1.63* 0.49 2.16
 Health care 1.58* 0.45 2.33 0.89 −0.11 0.60 1.20 0.18 0.97
 Public sector other 1.14 0.13 0.55 0.94 −0.06 0.25 0.70 −0.37 1.51
Size (small = 0)
 Middle 2.05** 0.72 5.03 1.47** 0.38 2.70 1.37* 0.31 2.26
 Large 2.94** 1.08 6.66 2.18** 0.78 4.89 2.27** 0.82 5.20
Personnel composition, proportion of:
 Older workers (50+) 2.84** 1.05 3.25 2.18* 0.78 2.43 3.61** 1.28 3.97
 Female workers 0.84 −0.17 0.48 1.21 0.19 0.53 0.82 −0.20 0.56
 Low educated workers 6.08** 1.80 9.14 0.92 −0.08 0.44 4.21** 1.44 7.45
 Part-time workers 0.76 −0.27 0.80 1.53 0.43 1.29 0.95 −0.05 0.15
Individual employer characteristics:
 Gender (male = 0) 1.02 0.02 0.11 0.96 −0.05 0.34 1.32* 0.28 2.11
 Age 0.98** −0.02 3.91 0.99 −0.01 1.19 0.99* −0.01 2.38
Position (director/CEO = 0)
 Owner 1.13 0.12 0.70 1.18 0.17 0.99 1.11 0.10 0.60
 General manager 0.88 −0.13 0.54 1.46 0.38 1.53 0.92 −0.08 0.33
 HR manager 1.06 0.06 0.31 0.97 −0.03 0.17 0.89 −0.12 0.62
 Other 0.77 −0.26 1.35 0.85 −0.17 0.86 0.67* −0.39 2.11
χ2 (df = 18) 315.3 76.18 162.6
Pseudo R2 .10 .03 .05
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Support for Public Pension Age Policies
Status Quo: Pension Age to  
Changes in Life Expectancya
Lower Pension Age for  
Physically Demanding Jobsb
Flexible Public  
Pension Ageb
(1) (2) (3)
Odds Ratio Coefficient t Value Odds Ratio Coefficient t Value Odds Ratio Coefficient t Value
Step 1: Only control variables
Sector (services/trade = 0)
 Industry 0.59* −0.52 2.41 1.41* 0.34 2.19 1.28 −0.25 1.26
 Construction 0.90 −0.10 0.29 3.72** 1.32 4.54 1.24 −0.22 0.68
 Education 1.29 0.25 0.91 2.17** 0.78 3.33 1.05 −0.05 0.17
 Health care 0.85 −0.16 0.65 1.29 0.25 1.31 1.19 −0.17 0.66
 Public sector other 0.81 −0.21 0.60 1.61 0,48 1.87 1.44 −0.36 0.98
Size (small = 0)
 Middle 1.25 0.22 1.17 1.01 0.01 0.07 1.40 −0.33 1.86
 Large 1.11 0.10 0.46 1.36 0.31 1.90 1.58 −0.46 2.15
Personnel composition, fraction of:
 Older workers (50+) 0.88 −0.13 0.30 0.56 −0.58 1.78 0.74 0.30 0.74
 Female workers 1.44 0.37 0.76 0.46* −0.79 2.14 2.33 −0.85 1.75
 Low educated workers 0.66 −0.42 1.65 2.21** 0.79 4.05 0.59* 0.53 2.07
 Part-time workers 0.97 −0.03 0.07 1.48 0.39 1.16 0.71 0.34 0.79
Individual employer characteristics:
 Gender (male = 0) 0.45** −0.80 4.18 1.45** 0.37 2.73 0.74 0.30 1.69
 Age 1.00 0.00 0.25 1.01 0.01 2.01 1.01 −0.01 0.70
Position (director/CEO = 0)
 Owner 0.90 −0.11 0.53 0.87 −0.13 0.77 1.22 −0.20 0.89
 General manager 0.26** −1.34 3.10 0.80 −0.22 0.87 1.27 −0.24 0.73
 HR manager 0.74 −0.31 1.20 0.94 −0.06 0.32 1.23 −0.21 0.81
 Other 0.52** −0.65 2.54 0.77 −0.26 1.38 0.88 0.13 0.53
χ2 (df = 18) 73.05 75.44 38.30
Pseudo R2 .06 .03 .02
Step 2: Model with key predictors
Concerns about prolonging working life:
 Physical demands (no/little = 0)
  Fairly concerned 0.66* −0.42 2.02 1.08 0.08 0.49 0.78 −0.25 1.13
  Very concerned 0.53** −0.63 2.55 1.81** 0.59 3.10 0.97 0.03 0.14
  Extremely concerned 0.28** −0.27 3.31 4.26** 1.45 5.46 0.78 0.25 0.78
 Mental demands (no/little = 0)
  Fairly concerned 0.55** −0.59 3.18 1.20 0.18 1.26 1.30 −0.26 1.41
  Very concerned 0.57** −0.57 2.54 1.06 0.06 0.36 1.65* −0.50 2.21
  Extremely concerned 0.11** −2.24 3.46 1.75 0.56 1.79 1.33 −0.28 0.78
 Limited employability workers with health problems (no/little = 0)
  Fairly concerned 0.99 −0.01 0.03 0.96 −0.04 0.23 1.23 −0.21 0.97
  Very concerned 0.96 −0.04 0.17 1.37 0.31 1.73 1.23 −0.21 0.90
  Extremely concerned 1.16 0.15 0.46 1.76* 0.57 2.36 1.14 −0.13 0.45
Controls
Sector (services/trade = 0)
 Industry 0.67 −0.40 1.78 1.24 0.21 1.31 1.29 −0.26 1.27
 Construction 1.63 0.49 1.11 2.61** 0.96 3.13 1.23 −0.21 0.63
 Education 1.50 0.40 1.41 2.04** 0.71 2.97 1.02 −0.02 0.07
 Health care 0.90 −0.11 0.41 1.19 0.17 0.86 121 −0.19 0.73
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workers’ physical capacities. Regarding the other alternative policy—a 
flexible public pension age—column 3 of Table 3 shows that support 
is not affected by employers’ concerns. This is a surprising finding be-
cause this policy option is often put forward in the (Dutch) public 
debate. Apparently, this option caters to many needs or desires, and 
perhaps the term “flexible” is associated with options that one is 
tempted to agree with instinctively, like the term “freedom” or “liberty” 
(Van Dalen & Henkens, 2018). One can detect only more support for 
flexible pension ages among employers who are very concerned about 
mental demands of working longer, but given that this effect is not dis-
played among those who are extremely concerned, this effect should 
be interpreted with care. A noteworthy finding is that support for flex-
ible public pension ages is positively associated with organizational 
size. It might be that this support among large(r) employers fits in with 
their preferences for having more policy instruments, such as an exit 
option, available in adjusting the composition of their workforce (Van 
Dalen et al., 2015). Especially in times of aging or when pension re-
forms occur increasing the public pension age, firms are tempted to 
use such arrangements to cope with unsustainable labor contracts with 
(steep) wage profiles (cf. Frimmel et al., 2018).
DISCUSSION
The Netherlands is a forerunner in reforming the public pension 
system by increasing the eligibility age for public pensions. The 
swift pace with which pension reforms have been implemented 
have taken the population by surprise and has generated a lot of un-
certainty, anxiety, anger, and concern, in particular, whether older 
workers are capable of dealing with the prospect of a substantially 
longer working life. This study is the first to show to which extent 
employers support increasing public pension ages, or policy alter-
natives such as a lower public pension age for physically demanding 
jobs or a system allowing flexible public pension ages. Our study 
shows that employers are highly concerned about the pace with 
which older workers are forced to extend their careers. In line with 
these concerns, employers largely dismiss the current public pen-
sion system in which the pension age is automatically indexed to the 
average life expectancy. And they firmly support a pension system 
in which the heterogeneity in work capacity of workers in their 
mid-sixties is reflected in their access to the public pensions, for in-
stance by offering lower public pension ages for workers in physic-
ally demanding jobs. A flexible public pension age also generates a 
lot of support among employers but, as our analysis shows, such a 
system does not tackle the core concerns of employers in the way 
the aforementioned system does that focuses on workers in physic-
ally demanding (and low income) jobs.
Though it is clear that many employers are concerned about 
workers’ ability to deal with much higher public pension ages, the ori-
gins of these concerns remain unclear. The level of concerns expressed 
by employers might be partly due to negative stereotyping of older 




Support for Public Pension Age Policies
Status Quo: Pension Age to  
Changes in Life Expectancya
Lower Pension Age for  
Physically Demanding Jobsb
Flexible Public  
Pension Ageb
(1) (2) (3)
Odds Ratio Coefficient t Value Odds Ratio Coefficient t Value Odds Ratio Coefficient t Value
Size (small = 0)
 Middle 1.60* 0.47 2.36 0.85 −0.17 1.12 1.37 −0.32 1.72
 Large 1.60 0.47 2.04 1.06 0.06 0.35 1.45 −0.37 1.69
Personnel composition, proportion of:
 Older workers (50+) 1.16 0.15 0.33 0.40** −0.91 2.69 0.68 −0.38 0.93
 Female workers 1.60 0.47 0.93 0.44* −0.83 2.19 2.42 −0.88 1.81
 Low educated workers 0.87 −0.13 0.49 1.32 0.28 1.31 0.60 0.50 1.85
 Part-time workers 0.93 −0.07 0.16 1.53 0.43 1.23 0.69 0.37 0.85
Individual employer characteristics:
 Gender (male = 0) 0.43** −0.83 4.21 1.48** 0.39 2.78 0.73 0.32 1.74
 Age 1.00 −0.00 0.53 1.02** 0.02 3.23 1.01 −0.01 0.75
Position (director/CEO = 0)
 Owner 0.92 −0.08 0.38 0.87 −0.14 0.80 1.17 −0.15 0.69
 General manager 0.24** −1.41 3.18 0.84 −0.17 0.66 1.15 −0.14 0.44
 HR manager 0.72 −0.32 1.22 0.94 −0.06 0.31 1.22 −0.20 0.76
 Other 0.48** −0.73 2.77 0.90 −0.10 0.53 0.85 0.17 0.69
χ2 (df = 27) 139.0 198.8 51.69
Pseudo R2 .11 .07 .03
ΔR2 .05 .04 .01
*p < .05. **p < .01.
aEstimated by means of logit analysis.
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of these concerns and to what extent they are linked to specific circum-
stances in their organizations.
Despite the limitations of what these stated policy preferences 
of employers show, the basic message of this paper is that employers 
have little faith in a one-size-fits-all approach that lurks behind the 
current public pension policies. Linking the public pension age to 
the average life expectancy may sound like a silver bullet solution to 
policy makers for solving the adverse consequences of population 
aging, the expected consequences are certainly not always benign 
(Miyazaki, 2014; Paulus, Siegloch, & Sommer, 2014). In the eyes of 
employers, the development of more differentiated pathways to re-
tirement is needed as in some demanding occupations, and for older 
workers with health issues, an extension of the working career is not 
a sustainable option.
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